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Picture This: Congress Doing the Decent Thing Permitting the Victims of Their Ex-lover's 
Cyberbullying to Go to Court under a Revised Communications Decency Act. 
John V. Kelly  
 
 
I. Introduction  
 Ending a relationship is painful. As the cliché tells/has it: "love can make most do crazy 
things." So too, can the break up. For some, the break up hurts so much that revenge becomes a 
driving force. Many men humiliate and harass their exes by disclosing images or videos of their 
exes in compromising positions.1 However, the converse is also true where jilted women in turn 
may seek to humiliate their former partners. Men and women turn to internet message boards and 
websites to post and reveal various flaws and shortcomings of their former lovers.2 Today the 
problem is far more pervasive with access to the internet, the quick upload and download speeds, 
larger data storage devices, and the explosive growth of sites devoted to user generated content. 
                                                                 
1 Doe v. Peterson, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30637 ( E.D. Mich. Mar. 24, 2011); Peterson v. 
Moldofsky, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 90633 (D. Kan. Sept. 29, 2009)(noting "See In re Thomas, 
254 B.R. 879, 885 (D.S.C. 1999) (concluding that the defendant's mailing of sexually explicit 
pictures of his ex-girlfriend to her new fiance was "so extreme and outrageous that it exceeded 
all possible bounds of decency"); Lucas v. Lucas, 2008 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 254, 2008 
WL 2696838, at *3 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. July 11, 2008) (declaring, in a case involving a 
restraining order, that the defendant's act of posting nude pictures of his wife on his car door 
window where they could be seen by the public was egregious); McGowan v. O'Rourke, 391 
N.J. Super. 502, 918 A.2d 716, 719 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2007) ("The act of mailing 
graphic pornographic pictures to a third-party and implying that they may be sent to the victim's 
workplace and her son is egregious."); Del Mastro v. Grimado, 2005 WL 2002355, at *3 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. Ch. Div. Aug. 19, 2005) (stating that "the distribution  of sexually explicit pictures of 
[the plaintiff] in Christmas cards to approximately 100 of her family members . . . is sufficiently 
extreme to constitute outrageous conduct"); see also Greenhorn v. Marriott Int'l, Inc., 258 F. 
Supp. 2d 1249, 1262 (D. Kan. 2003) (finding that the defendant's exposure of himself to plaintiff 
was extreme and outrageous); Miller v. Bircham, Inc., 874 F. Supp. 337, 341 (D. Kan. 
1995) (same)").; See also Floyd v. Dodson, 1984 OK Civ App 57 (Okla. Ct. App. 1984); Taylor 
v. Franko, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 75128 (D. Haw. July 11, 2011); Coton v. Televised Visual X-
Ography, Inc., 740 F. Supp. 2d 1299, 1302 (M.D. Fla. 2010); Hudson v. Windholz, 202 Ga. App. 
882 (Ga. Ct. App. 1992); Hudson v. Montcalm Pub. Corp., 190 Ga. App. 629 (Ga. Ct. App. 
1989); Shields v. Gross, 58 N.Y.2d 338 (N.Y. 1983) 
2 54 Clev. St. L. Rev. 115, 122 
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Vengeful exes are heading to the internet more and more frequently with the intent to embarrass 
or harm their reputation.  
 With the near limitless power and voice of the internet, this form of cyberbullying goes 
too far with no real adequate remedy.  The victims of cyberbullying are often left to pick up the 
pieces of their shattered and broken lives and damaged reputations. These actions often have 
severe consequences including humiliation, loss of reputation, being disowned from ones family, 
harm to their professional career, disruption or destruction of new relationships including 
marriages.3 The effects reach not only the intended victim, but parents, friends and other loved 
ones as well.4 The victims are usually undercompensated or worse not compensated at all 
because many of the civil remedies available do not adequately address the conduct that occurs 
on the internet. Even though dire consequences can await the bullies such as jail time and civil 
liability because most of the "bullies" do not have the resources to compensate the victims for the 
wrongs they caused.  Often, however, the bullies use major social networking websites or 
pornographic sites, and other internet businesses to inflict the harm, but these "deep pockets" are 
almost always shielded by the Communication Decency Act 47 USC §230.5 This note argues for 
a more adequate civil remedy for the victims of cyberbullying and less protection for those 
websites which facilitate bullying. 
 Part II of this note discusses relevant background issues, a brief overview of the 
Communication Decency Act 47 USC §230, an overview of certain cases which illustrate the 
shortcomings of the law as it is, and other technology and internet related Acts passed by 
                                                                 
3 Danielle Keats Citron, Essay: Law's Expressive Value in Combating Cyber Gender 
Harassment, 108 Mich. L. Rev. 373, 384 (2009). 
4 Terri Day, ARTICLE: The New Digital Dating Behavior - Sexting: Teens' Explicit Love Letters: 
Criminal Justice or Civil Liability, 33 Hastings Comm. & Ent. L.J. 69, 90 (2010). 
5 Zeran v. America Online, 958 F. Supp. 1124, 1133 (E.D. Va. 1997). 
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congress. Part III argues for federal legislation to address the shortcomings of the current laws. 
Part IV concludes this note. 
II. Background 
Good name in man and woman, dear my lord, 
Is the immediate jewel of their souls; 
Who steals my purse steals trash; 'tis something, nothing, 
'Twas mine, 'tis his, and has been slave to thousands; 
But he that filches of me my good name, 
Robs me of that which not enriches him, 
And makes me poor indeed. William Shakespeare, Othello III6 
 As Shakespeare wrote, damage done to reputation can be the most harmful of all wrongs. 
The victims of cyberbullying feel powerless, "in addition to feeling lonely, humiliated, and 
insecure, like victims of traditional bullying, cyberbullying victims also experience heightened 
feelings of anger, frustration, and depression.7 Even with the full force of the law behind a victim 
of cyberbullying with traditional non-internet related causes of action, the victim is not likely to 
be adequately redressed.8 For example, many internet websites which facilitate the bullies goals 
are allowed to escape liability even when the victim tells the website to remove the damaging 
post because it is untrue and the website refuses to take down the false posting. This is due to the 
immunity granted to internet service providers under the Communication Decency Act 47 USC 
§230.9 The harms done to the victim are sometimes unable to be righted through the current legal 
framework. There are at least 15 common law causes of action which may apply in these 
situations. They include:  Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress, Negligent Infliction of 
Emotional Distress, Invasion of Privacy, Public Disclosure of private facts, Intrusion upon 
                                                                 
6 Ryan Savage, ARTICLE: E-COMMERCE: Between a Rock and a Hard Place: Defamation and 
Internet Service Providers, 2 Asper Rev. Int'l Bus. & Trade L. 107 (2002). 
7 Karly Zande, ARTICLE: WHEN THE SCHOOL BULLY ATTACKS IN THE LIVING 
ROOM: USING TINKER TO REGULATE OFF-CAMPUS STUDENT CYBERBULLYING, 
13 Barry L. Rev. 103, 112 (2009). 
8 See generally Id. 
9 Doe v. Peterson, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30637 ( E.D. Mich. Mar. 24, 2011). 
4 
 
seclusion, Right of Publicity, False Light, Unreasonable publicity given to a person's private life, 
Defamation, Slander/libel, Child Pornography Prevention Act (In the cases dealing with couples 
under 18), Copyright, Extortion and Tortious interference with a contractual or business 
relationship.10 Other claims include fraud, forgerey and contractual - where an ex-husband 
forged a release to have his wife's sexually explicit photos placed in several pornographic 
magazines.11 
 While the claims may seem to create the potential for redress for a victim, in most cases 
the victim is not adequately compensated for the harm suffered because the bully has little if any 
funds to sustain a judgment against them and/or the facilitators, the internet websites and 
businesses, are protected because the Communications Decency Act 47 U.S.C. 230 pre-empts 
any cause of action against them shielding them from liability.12 Moreover, available to the 
defendants are numerous affirmative defenses which include, for example, the doctrine of pari 
delicto which bars suit at law or equity where the party seeking relief is himself involved in the 
wrong doing.13 For example, in the case of pornographic postings of the victim, the victim was a 
                                                                 
10 See generally Doe v. Peterson, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30637 ( E.D. Mich. Mar. 24, 2011); 
Peterson v. Moldofsky, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 90633 (D. Kan. Sept. 29, 2009); In re Thomas, 
254 B.R. 879, 885 (D.S.C. 1999) ; Lucas v. Lucas, 2008 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 254, 2008 
WL 2696838, at *3 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. July 11, 2008) ; McGowan v. O'Rourke, 391 N.J. 
Super. 502, 918 A.2d 716, 719 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2007); Del Mastro v. Grimado, 2005 
WL 2002355, at *3 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. Aug. 19, 2005); Greenhorn v. Marriott Int'l, Inc., 
258 F. Supp. 2d 1249, 1262 (D. Kan. 2003); Miller v. Bircham, Inc., 874 F. Supp. 337, 341 (D. 
Kan. 1995); Floyd v. Dodson, 1984 OK Civ App 57 (Okla. Ct. App. 1984); Taylor v. Franko, 
2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 75128 (D. Haw. July 11, 2011); Coton v. Televised Visual X-Ography, 
Inc., 740 F. Supp. 2d 1299, 1302 (M.D. Fla. 2010); Hudson v. Windholz, 202 Ga. App. 882 (Ga. 
Ct. App. 1992); Hudson v. Montcalm Pub. Corp., 190 Ga. App. 629 (Ga. Ct. App. 1989); Shields 
v. Gross, 58 N.Y.2d 338 (N.Y. 1983). 
11 Hudson v. Windholz, 202 Ga. App. 882 (Ga. Ct. App. 1992). 
12 Zeran, 958 F. Supp. at 1133 (E.D. Va. 1997). 
13 Doe v. Peterson, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30637 ( E.D. Mich. Mar. 24, 2011). 
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willing participant in the images or videos posted and this defense is sometimes raised with 
varying success.14 
 Judges and legal scholars agree that reform for cyberbullying is needed.15 This reform 
must come at the federal level due to the expansive reach of the Communications Decency Act 
47 U.S.C. 230. These offenses go to the very core of an individual's identity and often hurt more 
than simple in person bullying because in the virtual world the means and methods of 
humiliation and tortious conduct is near limitless and the duration of the bullying ongoing and 
pervasive.16 One scholar contends that there needs to be an online civil rights statute.17 
A. The Communications Decency Act 47 USC §230  
 Courts construing Section 230 shed light on congress's intent. "The section is generally 
recognized as Congress's response to a New York State court decision, Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. 
Prodigy Services Co. In this case, the court held that an online computer service could be held 
responsible as a "publisher" for allegedly libelous statements that an anonymous person posted to 
a bulletin board that Prodigy operated, even though Prodigy was not aware of those 
statements."18 "The policy underlying the CDA is the promotion of "the continued development 
of the Internet and other interactive computer services ... ' 47 USC §230(b)(1). To ensure that 
web site operators and other interactive computer services would not be crippled by lawsuits 
                                                                 
14 See Doe v. Peterson, 784 F. Supp. 2d 831, 839 ( E.D. Mich. 2011). 
15William H. Frievogel, Article: Does the Communications Decency Act Foster Indecency?,  16 
Comm. L. & Pol'y 17, 41 (2011). 
16 Zande, supra note 7, at 110. 
17 Danielle Keats Citron, Cyber Civil Rights, 89 B.U.L. Rev. 61 (2009). 
18 1995 WL 323710 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1995) reargument denied, 1995 WL 805178 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 
1995). See also Zeran v. Am. Online Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 331 (4th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, Zeran 
v. Am. Online, Inc., 524 U.S. 937 (1998). 
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arising out of third-party communications, the Act provides interactive computer services with 
immunity."19 Other policy rationales include: 
(2) to preserve the vibrant and competitive free market that presently exists for the 
Internet and other interactive computer services, unfettered by Federal or State 
regulation; (3) to encourage the development of technologies which maximize 
user control over what information is received by individuals, families, and 
schools who use the Internet and other interactive computer services; (4) to 
remove disincentives for the development and utilization of blocking and filtering 
technologies that empower parents to restrict their children's access to 
objectionable or inappropriate online material; and (5) to ensure vigorous 
enforcement of Federal criminal laws to deter and punish trafficking in obscenity, 
stalking, and harassment by means of computer.20 
However, the act’s effect goes beyond the original intent. The act essentially shields all 
interactive computer services and information content providers from liability. The relevant part 
of the act which pertains to civil liability provides: 
(c) Protection for "Good Samaritan" blocking and screening of offensive material. 
(1) Treatment of publisher or speaker. No provider or user of an interactive 
computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information 
provided by another information content provider.     
(2) Civil liability. No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be 
held liable on account of-- (A) any action voluntarily taken in good faith to 
restrict access to or availability of material that the provider or user considers to 
be obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, harassing, or otherwise 
objectionable, whether or not such material is constitutionally protected; or (B) 
any action taken to enable or make available to information content providers or 
others the technical means to restrict access to material described in paragraph (1) 
[subparagraph (A)].21 
The terms interactive computer services and information content providers are defined terms 
under the act which mean: 
(2) Interactive computer service. The term "interactive computer service" means 
any information service, system, or access software provider that provides or 
enables computer access by multiple users to a computer server, including 
                                                                 
19 Doe v. MySpace, Inc, 474 F. Supp. 2d 843, 847 (W.D. Tex. 2007).  
20 47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(2)-(5) 
21 47 U.S.C. § 230(c) 
7 
 
specifically a service or system that provides access to the Internet and such 
systems operated or services offered by libraries or educational institutions.  
(3) Information content provider. The term "information content provider" means 
any person or entity that is responsible, in whole or in part, for the creation or 
development of information provided through the Internet or any other interactive 
computer service.22 
 
 Under the CDA, however, all ISPs are treated the same, even if they have some level of 
involvement in the  posting. For example, in Batzel v. Smith, Smith sent a false email to the 
Museum Security Network, a group focused on stolen art.23 The email claimed, that Batzel 
descended from a high ranking Nazi official and she had in her possession possible stolen 
artwork.24 However, Smith could not send the email directly to the group, instead it went through 
a moderator who resent the email to the group.25 Thus, the internet service provider had some 
degree of involvement posting the message. The CDA also requires no affirmative response by 
the ISP, even when it receives specific and repeated notice that a defamatory statement has been 
posted on or through its network.26 A common theme in the case law that follows this section is 
the under compensation and/or dismissal of many claims brought by very injured plaintiffs. 
Some cases are completely dismissed due to the CDA. 
B. Zeran v. America Online  
 The facts of Zeran v. America Online are straight forward. Zeran was the victim of 
cyberbullying, where someone perpetrated a malicious hoax on him through the internet services 
                                                                 
22 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(2)-(3). 
23 Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018, 1020-1021 (9th Cir. 2003). 
24 Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018, 1021 (9th Cir. 2003). 
25 Id. 
26 Sarah Duran, Hear No Evil, See No Evil, Spread No Evil: Creating a Unified Legislative 
Approach to Internet Service Provider Immunity,12 U. Balt. Intell. Prop. L.J. 115, 133-134 
(2004). 
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of America Online.27 "An unknown person or persons, acting without Zeran's knowledge or 
authority, affixed Zeran's name and telephone number to a series of notices on AOL's electronic 
"bulletin board" advertising t-shirts and other items with slogans glorifying the bombing of the 
Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma  City, Oklahoma in which 168 people were 
killed."28 This event is better known as the Oklahoma City Bombing of April 19, 1994 in which 
Timothy McVeigh was put to death for his involvement. "Predictably, Zeran received numerous 
disturbing and threatening telephone calls from people outraged with the posted notice."29 For 
nearly three weeks Zeran was receiving threatening phone calls at an interval of two per minute 
and he and his home were placed on police surveillance for his own protection and it was not 
until three weeks later did the threatening calls subside to about 15 per day.30 Zeran sued 
claiming AOL was negligent.31 
 AOL moved for judgment on the pleadings under the CDA 47 U.S.C. 230.32 Thus the 
only question was "whether the CDA preempts any state common law cause of action Zeran may 
have against AOL resulting from its role in the malicious hoax perpetrated via AOL's electronic 
bulletin board."33 Zeran did not contest that AOL is an interactive computer service as defined by 
the CDA and the court held it is clear that AOL meets the statutory definition of such a service.34 
Also, Zeran does "claim that the bogus notices were anything but information provided by 
another information content provider."35 Thus, the court further winnowed "the preemption issue 
                                                                 
27 Zeran v. America Online, 958 F. Supp. 1124, 1126 (E.D. Va. 1997). 
28 Id.  
29 Id. 
30 Id. at 1128. 
31 Id. at 1126. 
32 Zeran, 958 F. Supp. at 1129. 
33 Id. 
34 Id. at 1131. 
35 Id. at 1132. 
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reduces to the question whether a state cause of action for negligent distribution of defamatory 
material directly conflicts with the CDA's prohibition against treating an Internet provider as a 
"publisher or speaker".36 "Put another way, the question is whether imposing common law 
distributor liability on AOL amounts to treating it as a publisher or speaker. If so, the state claim 
is preempted."37 The court recognized that Congress' intent was to overrule Oakmont, Inc. v. 
Prodigy Services Co. and that it was codified in the act as discussed in the preceding section 
supra.38 
 The court held the state common law claim was preempted and thus unable to be brought 
giving Zeran no recourse for the cyberbullying that was done to him.39 The Court reasoned: 
Clearly, then, distributor liability discourages Internet providers from engaging in 
efforts to review online content and delete objectionable material, precisely the 
effort Congress sought to promote in enacting the CDA. Indeed, the most 
effective means by which an Internet provider could avoid the inference of a 
"reason to know" of objectionable material on its service would be to distance 
itself from any control over or knowledge of online content provided by third 
parties. This effect frustrates the purpose of the CDA and, thus, compels 
preemption of state law claims for distributor liability against interactive 
computer service providers.40 
 This may be true; the statute itself is unclear and the legislative history is unenlightening 
on this point. However, the language seems broad enough to preclude a finding that a service is a 
publisher merely because it makes efforts to restrict content.41 
C. Doe v. Peterson  
                                                                 
36 Id.  
37 Id.  
38 Id. at 1134. 
39 Zeran, 958 F. Supp. at 1135. 
40 Id. 
41 David R. Sheridan, Article: Zeran v. Aol and the Effect of Section 230 of the Communication 
Decency Act upon Liability for Defamation on the internet , 61 Alb. L. Rev. 147, 160 (1997). 
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 In Doe v. Peterson, plaintiff Doe four months before her 18th birthday was requested by 
her 18 year old boy friend M.G., who was in the military, to send nude and sexually explicit 
photographs of herself to him.42 Plaintiff complied with the request by using a digital camera 
with a timer and then uploading the images on her father's computer and emailing them to her 
boyfriend in May 2007.43 The couple eventually split.44  
 Around December 2008, Plaintiff was notified the images of her appeared on 
Imagebeaver.com and later on submityourex.com.45 Plaintiff emailed both sites and demanded 
the pictures be removed.46 Both sites complied.47 In May 2009 the images surfaced on 
exgfpics.com and plaintiff was informed by her sister that people at school were talking about 
it.48 Plaintiff asked her now former boyfriend about the posting of her pictures who denied 
posting the pictures, but would attempt to find out who did.49 He was unable to determine who 
did upload the pictures to the website, but emailed the website demanding the images be taken 
down.50 Plaintiff herself emailed in June demanding the images be taken down, but the pictures 
never were.51  
 The Plaintiff initiated the suit against the owner Erik Peterson, the website owner and 
operator.52 The Court considered and granted summary judgment on all of the claims except for 
two. Two of the claims the Court granted summary judgment on was the intrusion upon 
                                                                 
42 Doe v. Peterson, 784 F. Supp. 2d 831, 839 ( E.D. Mich. 2011). 
43 Id. at 834. 
44 Id. at 835. 
45 Id. 
46 Id. 
47 Id. 
48 Id. 
49 Id. 
50 Id. 
51 Id. at 836. 
52 Id.  
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seclusion claim and public disclosure of private facts because the images were already portrayed 
on two other public websites.53 Of the two claims that remained one was a violation of the Child 
Pornography prevention act because she was still a minor at the time she took the photographs.54 
Where the court held there was enough evidence to reach a jury on the issue of whether the 
defendant knowingly posted sexually explicit pictures of a minor.55 
 D. Peterson v. Moldofsky, Taylor v. Franko, and Hudson v. Montcalm Pub. Copr.  
 In Peterson v. Moldofsky, defendant Moldofsky had an intimate relationship with Piper 
Peterson.56 During the course of their relationship, Plaintiff permitted Defendant to take pictures 
of her engaged in sexually explicit acts with other couples.57 The couple eventually had a falling 
out and in acts of revenge, Moldofsky emailed sexually explicit images of Peterson to Peterson's 
mother, co-workers, boss, ex-husband, and current boyfriend.58 The court granted all but two 
claims for summary judgment.59 The emotional distress claim remained as did the public 
disclosure of private facts.60 The other claims were dismissed because the Defendant was 
permitted to be there and take the pictures.61 
 In Talyor v. Franko, Franko, the defendant, permitted entry of a default judgment against 
him.62 Talyor and Franko had an intimate relationship and she permitted Franko to take images 
of her engaged in sexual acts.63 Franko eventually proposed to Taylor.64 Taylor rejected the 
                                                                 
53 Id. at 840-43. 
54 Id. at 839-40. 
55 Id. at 840. 
56 Peterson v. Moldofsky, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 90633, *1 (D. Kan. Sept. 29, 2009). 
57 Id. 
58 Id. 
59 See generally Id. 
60 See Id. 
61 See Id. 
62 Taylor v. Franko, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 75128 *1 (D. Haw. July 11, 2011). 
63 Id. 
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proposal and the couple split.65 Franko eventually peppered the sexually explicit images all over 
the internet along with Taylor's contact information.66 Taylor began getting unwanted phone 
calls and emails requesting sexual encounters.67 The phone calls even came in at work, and the 
calls were directed to some co-workers, when the caller could not reach the Plaintiff.68 All of this 
caused the Plaintiff great embarrassment.69 The court only granted her damages on three 
counts.70 
 In Hudson, Plaintiff and her ex-husband, Gordon, were divorced, yet continued on a 
romantic relationship together.71 During the continued relationship Mrs. Hudson met and began 
seeing her current husband. She saw the two men simultaneously.72 Her ex-husband eventually 
found out and felt betrayed.73 The Defendant, Gordon, then began a spree of conduct intended to 
humiliate Mrs. Hudson which includes: Mr. Gordon distributed a number of sexually explicit 
photographs of Ms. Hudson, and he threatened to send these photographs to her boss and every 
real estate agency in Atlanta.74 He sent nude photographs of her to two magazines and forged a 
model release form.75 Two weeks before the marriage of Mr. and Ms. Hudson, Mr. Hudson 
found in his mailbox a copy of one of the magazines.76 This caused Ms. Hudson extreme 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
64 Id. 
65 Id. 
66 Id. at *3-4. 
67 Id. at *6. 
68 Id. *7-8. 
69 Id. at *9. 
70 Id. at *13-14. 
71 Hudson v. Windholz, 202 Ga. App. 882, 882-883 (Ga. Ct. App. 1992). 
72 Id. 
73 Id. 
74 Hudson v. Windholz, 202 Ga. App. 882, 882-883 (Ga. Ct. App. 1992). 
75 Id. at 883. 
76 Id. at 883. 
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emotional distress, driving her to almost cancel her wedding.77 On the wedding day, a plant was 
sent to the couple with another explicit photograph inside. 78 After traveling to her daughter's 
wedding, Ms. Hudson's mother returned home to Florida to find a copy of the explicit magazine 
had been given to her.79 Someone had broken into Ms. Hudson's car and glued sexually explicit 
images to the dash board.80 The sequence of events caused extreme emotional distress in Ms. 
Hudson.81 
 In this action the publisher of the Magazine in which Mrs. Hudson appeared was also 
sued but was released from the suit because the relied in good faith on a release forged by 
Defendant Gordon and the Plaintiff's themselves signed a release from liability to obtain the 
fraudulent release.82 
E. Doe v. Myspace  
 There are several cases named Doe v. Mysapce.83 Each case involves an underage girl, 
who created a Myspace profile claiming she was eighteen years old or more.84 After creating a 
profile, the girls unwittingly met, chatted with, and agreed to meet with online predators.85 
During the meetings the girls were sexually assaulted.86 The parents of these girls then sued 
                                                                 
77 Id. at 883. 
78 Id. at 883.  
79 Id. at 883. 
80 Id. at 883. 
81 Hudson v. Windholz, 202 Ga. App. 882, 883 (Ga. Ct. App. 1992). 
82 Hudson v. Montcalm Pub. Corp., 190 Ga. App. 629, 633 (Ga. Ct. App. 1989). 
83 Doe v. MySpace, Inc., 474 F. Supp. 2d 843, 845 (W.D. Tex. 2007) aff'd, 528 F.3d 413 (5th 
Cir. 2008); Doe v. MySpace, Inc. 175 CA App 4th 561 (2009). 
84 Doe v. MySpace, Inc., 474 F. Supp. 2d 843, 846 (W.D. Tex. 2007). 
85 Id. 
86 Id. 
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Myspace for failing to protect them.87 Myspace moved to dismiss pursuant to rule 12 because the 
CDA gave Myspace immunity.88 And the courts have granted the dismissal.89 
F. Other Acts of Congress Concerning the Internet and Technology. 
 Congress has enacted several acts which touch upon the internet and technology and 
provide the victims who are harmed with an adequate civil remedy, while not frustrating the 
growth of the internet. Three such acts are the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA),90 The 
Child Pornography Prevention Act,91 and the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA).92 
Both the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act and the Child Pornography Prevention act even 
criminalizes the conduct it seeks to prevent while giving the victims an adequate civil remedy 
with which to bring suit under.93 94  
 The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act seeks to prevent computer damage and unauthorized 
access to a computer system.95 The Child Pornography Prevention Act seeks to prevent 
production, transmission, and possession of child pornography.96 The Computer Fraud and 
Abuse Act provides: "Any person who suffers damage or loss by reason of a violation of this 
section may maintain a civil action against the violator to obtain compensatory damages and 
injunctive relief or other equitable relief."97 This in addition to criminalizing the breaking and 
entering into computer systems the act provides the victim an adequate civil remedy. The Child 
                                                                 
87 Id. 
88 Id. 
89 Id. 
90 18 USC § 1030. 
91 18 USC § 2252A. 
92 17 USC § 512. 
93 18 USC § 1030(b)-(c), (g). 
94 18 USC § 2252A(b), (f). 
95 See generally 18 USC § 1030. 
96 See generally 18 USC § 2252A. 
97 18 USC § 1030(g). 
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Pornography Prevention Act  provides: "In general. Any person aggrieved by reason of the 
conduct prohibited under subsection (a) or (b) or section 1466A  may commence a civil action 
for the relief set forth in paragraph (2)."98 Also affording the victims their day in court to attempt 
to right the injustice they have suffered and compensate them for their loss. Both of these acts 
adequately serve the twin aims of deterrence and compensating victims for their loss.99 Congress' 
goal in enacting the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act was to create fluid act that is not rigid to 
allow the law to adapt to bring as many would be defendants to justice with letting as few as 
possible slip through the cracks of the law.100 The goal of the Child Pornography Prevention Act 
is to prevent and protect the children from extremely damaging behavior and to compensate them 
and assist them coping with the abuse if they should fall victim to child pornography.101 
 The Digital Millennium Copyright Act like the Communications Decency Act concerns 
internet service providers.102 However, unlike the Communications Decency Act, the immunity 
provided the Digital Millennium Copyright Act is not absolute.103 The Digital Millennium 
Copyright Act provides specific steps which need to be taken in order to receive the immunity.104 
(c) Information residing on systems or networks at direction of users. 
   (1) In general. A service provider shall not be liable for monetary relief, or, 
except as provided in subsection (j), for injunctive or other equitable relief, for 
infringement of copyright by reason of the storage at the direction of a user of 
material that resides on a system or network controlled or operated by or for the 
service provider, if the service provider-- 
      (A) (i) does not have actual knowledge that the material or an activity using 
the material on the system or network is infringing; 
                                                                 
98 18 USC § 2252A(f). 
99 See generally 18 USC § 1030; See generally 18 USC § 2252A. 
100 Shaw v. Toshiba Am. Info. Sys., 91 F. Supp. 2d 926, 936 (E.D. Tex. 1999). 
101 United States v. MacEwan, 445 F.3d 237, 250 (3d Cir. 2006). 
102  See 17 USC § 512. 
103 See 17 USC § 512. 
104 17 USC § 512(c). 
16 
 
         (ii) in the absence of such actual knowledge, is not aware of facts or 
circumstances from which infringing activity is apparent; or 
         (iii) upon obtaining such knowledge or awareness, acts expeditiously to 
remove, or disable access to, the material; 
      (B) does not receive a financial benefit directly attributable to the infringing 
activity, in a case in which the service provider has the right and ability to control 
such activity; and 
      (C) upon notification of claimed infringement as described in paragraph (3), 
responds expeditiously to remove, or disable access to, the material that is 
claimed to be infringing or to be the subject of infringing activity.105 
 
 Most noteworthy of the Digital Millennium Copyright act is the notice and take down 
provisions of the act.106 The act permits a copyright owner to notify an internet service provider 
of infringing content on their server.107 The act outlines specific actions and steps which must be 
undertaken by the copyright owner to comply with Act by providing the internet service provider 
with appropriate and specific notice.108 Once notified, an internet service provider must act 
"expeditiously to remove" the infringing material to qualify for the immunity.109 The Policy 
behind the Digital Millennium Copyright Act is to continue to promote development of the 
internet while protecting the rights of copyright owners and encourage the copyright owners to 
use digital formats without fear of piracy.110 The act takes into account not only the promotion 
and growth of the internet and technology but potential victims who may be harmed by the use 
of that technology. 
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III. Argument  
 As the foregoing cases in illustrate, the plaintiffs who suffer extreme harms are under 
compensated or not compensated at all. The victims must cope with their injuries everyday of 
their lives. After enduring embarrassment and harassment through no fault of their own the court 
room door is slammed shut in their faces. While, the actual bully is usually brought to justice, it 
is the facilitators who escape justice's grasp.111 The facilitators, who give the bullies the voice 
and forum, continuously evade liability. These facilitators continue to avoid liability even after 
they are alerted to the false and/or damaging nature of the content they are hosting, and remain 
obstinate to the facts and refuse to act.112 If they can continue to skirt liability there is no 
deterrence for them to prevent these sorts of injuries from occurring and no deterrence for failing 
to protect the innocent.  
 In these cases they must have an affirmative duty to act. They aid and abet the bullies by 
giving them a voice and the means to truly hurt their intended victim. With the advent of the 
internet the effects are far more reaching than in the days prior to the internet causing even more 
anguish upon the victims. Compare Hudson, supra, where the court stated "had Mr. Gordon not 
personally distributed the Gallery issue to Ms. Hudson's relatives and employer, she might never 
have known that it existed, thereby never incurring any damages. Mr. Windholz also feared that 
the introduction of the other far  more explicit photographs of Ms. Hudson in a suit against 
Gallery would injure Ms. Hudson's character more severely than had the publication of the 
relatively innocuous nude photograph in Gallery"113 with the far reaching effects of Zeran114 and 
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Taylor supra.115 In Hudson, the audience who viewed the explicit images of Ms. Hudson was 
quite limited.116 The group was limited to the few subscribers to the small magazine and those 
who the defendant actually sent the images to.117 Where with the internet, the number of 
potential viewers is limited by only the number of internet connections throughout the world. For 
example in Zeran, it was not long before radio stations got wind of the prank and began 
broadcasting it to the listeners and countless others saw the actual post on the internet.118 
 While Congress acted to protect the development of the internet in passing the 
Communications Decency Act and arguably successfully did so.119 Congress failed to predict the 
effects the Communications Decency Act would have on victims of vengeful acts as the cases, 
supra, indicate. Congress must not ignore the pain and agony suffered by these victims anymore. 
The Communications Decency Act does not need to be repealed but merely amended because its 
original goal of promoting the growth and progress of the internet is still a goal worth promoting, 
but not at the utter expense of an individual's reputation. What Congress should do is remove the  
absolute publisher immunity and replace it with a limited immunity similar to that of the Digital 
Millennium Copyright Act.120 Moreover, the act should add a criminal bullying section and 
create a civil remedy for the victims of such defaming conduct by cyberbullies similar to that of 
the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act and the Child Pornography Prevention Act.121 And as one 
commentator contends, there must be an Online Civil Rights Act.122 As with most civil rights 
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acts there should be attorney's fees and costs available to the prevailing victim.123 This will serve 
the twin aims of both deterrence for would be future offenders and the ability to compensate the 
victims, while still maintaining the original goals of the Communications Decency Act, 
promoting the growth and progress of the internet.124 
 The publisher immunity should not be entirely removed. It should be given a reasonable 
grace period. Where after 48 hours of notice the publisher must remove the content or lose their 
immunity permitting victims to not only go after the bully, but those who stubbornly aid the 
bully as well. Much akin to the Notice and Takedown provisions of the Digital Millennium 
Copyright Act, which provides:  
Elements of notification. 
      (A) To be effective under this subsection, a notification of claimed 
infringement must be a written communication provided to the designated agent 
of a service provider that includes substantially the following: 
         (i) A physical or electronic signature of a person authorized to act on behalf 
of the owner of an exclusive right that is allegedly infringed. 
         (ii) Identification of the copyrighted work claimed to have been infringed, 
or, if multiple copyrighted works at a single online site are covered by a single 
notification, a representative list of such works at that site. 
         (iii) Identification of the material that is claimed to be infringing or to be the 
subject of infringing activity and that is to be removed or access to which is to be 
disabled, and information reasonably sufficient to permit the service provider to 
locate the material. 
         (iv) Information reasonably sufficient to permit the service provider to 
contact the complaining party, such as an address, telephone number, and, if 
available, an electronic mail address at which the complaining party may be 
contacted. 
         (v) A statement that the complaining party has a good faith belief that use of 
the material in the manner complained of is not authorized by the copyright 
owner, its agent, or the law. 
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         (vi) A statement that the information in the notification is accurate, and 
under penalty of perjury, that the complaining party is authorized to act on behalf 
of the owner of an exclusive right that is allegedly infringed.125 
 
 The Digital Millennium Copyright Act states the necessary prerequisites for providing 
notice and the Communications Decency Act should be no different. The court in Zeran was 
quick to point out that "the simple fact of notice surely cannot transform one from an original 
publisher to a distributor in the eyes of the law."126 While, the Court is correct that such notice 
cannot turn a publisher into a distributor, however, Congress can remove the immunity granted 
to such publishers when presented with adequate notice of the wrong and defamatory content. 
One key difference between the Digital Millennium Copyright Act and the proposal would be to 
incorporate a hard set amount of time with which to comply with the takedown notice, 48 hours 
instead of expeditiously as in the Digital Millennium Copyright Act.127 The reason being the 
more time a damaging image or story is up, the more potential reputational harm, i.e. 
immeasurable harm to the victim. Furthermore, this would prevent internet service providers 
from dragging their feet when the simple act of removing the content can act to alleviate some of 
the emotional distress of the victim. Moreover, the hard coded time creates certainty and clarity 
and emphasizes the immediate and lasting nature the harm. Also, creating the hard set time will 
create clarity and prevent courts from being bogged down as to whether a defendant acted 
"expeditiously."128 
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 The Digital Millennium Copyright act has been criticized for the effects of its Notice and 
Takedown provisions.129 "A bigger concern, from a public policy standpoint, is that it strongly 
compels an ISP to take materials down and ask questions later."130 While this "take down first 
ask questions later"131 may be criticized as making copyright owners superior to the goals of 
promoting the internet, this unequal position should be welcomed for victims of defamation and 
cyberbullying because harms done to one's reputation is truly immeasurable unlike the harm of 
infringing upon one's copyright.  The reputation of a cyberbully victim is so much more valuable 
when compared to the infringed rights of a copyright holder that this same criticism would be 
seriously undermined.  
 The Digital Millennium Copyright act has also been criticized because it "runs afoul of 
the First Amendment's guarantee of free speech."132 "Legislation that allows an ISP to take down 
another's speech before the speaker has a chance to argue against removal is clearly a restriction 
on speech."133 Again, with the victims of cyberbullying the notice and take down provisions 
would not run afoul of the First Amendment's guarantee of free speech because the defaming 
nature of the speech is simply not protected because it is harming the reputation of the victims or 
the content is not protected because of the right to  privacy violations of the victim. Also, other 
criticisms include that such a threat of loss of immunity will cause many risk-averse internet 
service providers with legitimate defenses and arguments to take down materials that are not 
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infringing.134 Here to, the difference turns on the harm caused by the cyberbully versus the 
would be infringer, and the damaged suffered by reputational harm to victim is not quantifiable. 
 Furthermore, by adding a criminal provision Congress would recognize the great 
reputation harms perpetrated upon the victims as Shakespeare so elegantly put it above, the 
victims are being robbed of not just their monetary value, they are being robbed of something 
that is truly immeasurable, something that goes to the essence of who they are, their very core, 
their reputation. Congress should criminalize these acts which seek revenge and to humiliate and 
embarrass the victim along with degrading their reputation. By doing this and imposing stiff jail 
sentences upon bullies, future instances of bullying will be deterred because bullies will realize 
and actually be able to see that their actions have consequences that society recognizes and does 
not want to be a part of. By adding the criminal element congress will bring the Communications 
Decency Act more in line with the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act and the Child Pornography 
Prevention Act.135 Both are acts which are influenced and guided by modern technology.136 Both 
criminalize the conduct it seeks to prevent while simultaneously giving the victims a recognized 
civil remedy.137 
 By giving the victim a recognized civil remedy the, Plaintiff will no longer need to play a 
guessing game as to what claims will stick. As one judge eloquently put it, Plaintiffs must 
employ a "double barrel" shotgun approach in an attempt to hit upon a claim which relief may be 
granted.138 They know definitively that a claim is available to them and that they can recover 
their damages. This will also have the public policy effect of making plaintiff's attorneys more 
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willing to take the cases of the aggrieved victims to enforce their rights because an element of 
certainty is added. 
 Congress' goal in enacting the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act was to create fluid act that 
is not rigid to allow the law to adapt to bring as many would be defendants to justice with letting 
as few as possible slip through the cracks of the law.139 Due to the goal to attempt to reach as 
many would-be defendants as possible, courts have had difficulty in interpreting what the 
expansive language of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act actually means.140 Even terms 
Congress felt would be self-explanatory, such as exceeding authorized access, prove difficult for 
courts to interpret or even agree upon the meaning of such undefined terms.141 However, in the 
context of cyberbullying, the expansive nature of such a proposed change would not be a 
detriment and the same problems of interpretation will not apply. Courts under the Computer 
Fruad and Abuse Act have struggled interpreting the act because the conduct sought to be 
deemed wrong is largely undefined.142 Where instead under an amended Communications 
Decency Act, the wrong conduct is straight forward and clear, which is any defaming, wrongful, 
reputational related harm posted on the internet. Many state courts have clear laws on what is 
wrongful speech and content, which harms an individuals reputation.143 Congress can codify one 
of the many very well thought out defamation laws of a state. Moreover, the expansive nature is 
desired and a good thing under the proposed changes to the Communications Decency Act 
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because the wronged conduct will be clear and it will be desirous to bring as many facilitators 
and bullies to justice. 
 One criticism of the Child Pornography Prevention Act, is that it goes too far in that it 
criminalizes acts or images where no children were harmed or the defendant never even actually 
viewed or possessed child pornography. For example in 2009, a 39 year old prolific collector of 
Japanese Magna Art, a popular Japanese art style, plead guilty to the possession of obscene 
visual representations of sexual abuse of children.144 Some of his art collection displayed 
children engaged in sex acts.145 This was a man who was a fan of the art style so much he got his 
hands on anything he could related to this artistic style not thinking any of the art would be 
condemned.146 The artistic style and even the sexual images in question are common place in 
Japan and Asia, as the style is "huge" over there as one expert on Japanese Magna noted.147 This 
marks the first time someone was convicted for possessing only cartoon art without any evidence 
that the defendant also collected or viewed actual child pornography.148 The proposed changes to 
the Communications Decency Act, while it will be broad will not suffer from the same problems 
because the changes would require an affirmative step by both cyberbullies and internet service 
providers. The cyberbullies must take action to post content aimed at embarrassment or create 
reputational related harm to the victim, and the facilitators or internet service providers must 
disregard clear notice from the victims and fail to take down the harmful post. 
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 The united states code 42 U.S.C. § 1988 codifies attorney's fees for the prevailing party 
in civil rights actions.149 "The purpose of § 1988 is to ensure 'effective access to the judicial 
process' for persons with civil rights grievances."150 "It is sufficient to comment that the very 
purpose of awarding attorneys' fees in civil rights cases is to assure that private enforcement 
remains available to those citizens who have little or no money with which to hire an 
attorney."151 The rights of the victims of cyberbullying in these instances are being degraded and 
violated and the victims often feel powerless and alone.152 "In addition to feeling lonely, 
humiliated, and insecure, like victims of traditional bullying, cyberbullying victims also 
experience heightened feelings of anger, frustration, and depression."153 The law should help the 
powerless by ensuring access to effective counsel. And furthermore, it will ensure the private 
enforcement of victims' rights to even those who have little or no money to hire an attorney, 
because these helpless victims should not go on without being assisted and their rights 
vindicated. 
 Ideally this reform would not be necessary, but the sad truth is for whatever reason 
vengeance, humiliation and embarrassment becomes a driving force to harm a person one once 
loved. When this less than ideal situation occurs the law should act to assist in providing justice 
for the victims and not turn a blind eye. Thus, this reform proposal would help remedy the blind 
eye the law takes. The new face of the Communications Decency Act will hopefully look 
something like this: A jilted lover decides to cyberbully their ex and post a video of the two of 
them engaging in sexual acts on the internet, the ex learns the video is online and complies with 
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the notice provision of the act and notifies the internet service provider of the damaging content 
demanding its removal. The internet service provider has 48 hours to comply with the demand. If 
the internet service provider does comply with the demand, the internet service provider gets to 
keep its immunity, but the bully faces jail time and civil liability under the act. However, should 
the internet service provider fail to act and remove the damaging content, in addition to the jail 
time the bully faces and civil liability, the internet service provider loses its immunity and the 
victim can also file suit against the internet service provider under the act's civil liability section 
as well. And once the victim prevails under either scenario, the defendants should be ordered to 
pay the attorney's fees and costs related to the litigation of protecting and enforcing the victim's 
rights. 
 Given the state of the law, and the endless parade of uncompensated victims having the 
courtroom door slammed in their faces, Congressional Action is necessary to address an 
imbalance in the law. The proposed changes will both serve the original intent behind the CDA 
and the goal of compensating the victim. 
IV. Conclusion  
 The federal government must act to create a type of federal anti-cyberbullying statute 
which criminalizes the conduct of not only the bully, but those who facilitate the bully's handy 
work without attempting to correct or stop the bully's behavior. The statute should also create a 
private cause of action as well, similar to other cyber crime statutes such as the Computer Fraud 
and Abuse Act, Digital Millennium Copyright Act and the Child Pornography Prevention Act. 
This will give not only law enforcement officials the tools necessary to prosecute the bullies, but 
also create a one size fits all civil remedy that is easy to apply so that the victims, who are often 
severely injured in several respects to be compensated swiftly. 
